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Abstract 
The 2010 Australian election returned the first ‘hung’ House of Representatives since the Second 
World War.  This paper tracks the political lessons of history to the only other time when a prime 
minister had to work in a hung parliament.  Circumstances and political parties differ, but on closer 
examination some common themes emerge.  The prime ministership is both a gift and a burden, where 
control is, for the most part illusory.  R.G. Menzies lacked the personal qualities his parliamentary 
colleagues found in Arthur Fadden.  In 1941 he lost the prime ministership because he lost the support 
of his party room.  Just as she had defeated Kevin Rudd in 2010, Julia Gillard was eventually defeated 
in a caucus ballot in June 2013. However, at least initially, Gillard displayed personal traits which 
Rudd lacked and which enabled her to retain the trust of both the ALP caucus and key independents 
Members. History contains some valid lessons which, given recent events, need restating:  relationships 
in politics matter.  
 
 
1 The author wishes to thank Rod Rhodes, John Kane, Anne Tiernan and two anonymous AJPH 
referees for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts. This essay was accepted for 
publication prior to the replacement of Julia Gillard as ALP leader and prime minister by her rival, 





“History with all her volumes vast hath but one page” (Lord Byron). 
How valid is it to compare governments separated by more than 70 years? While political parties, 
along with their support base, have changed, politics remain a career choice not suited to the faint 
hearted. Today, a ubiquitous adversarial media, heightened level of scrutiny on all aspects of political 
life, and the phenomenon of social media increase the pressure. Acknowledging these differences, 
some truths resonate. This article examines the early federal careers of two Prime Ministers (Robert 
Menzies and Arthur Fadden), to ascertain whether any lessons can be drawn from history in relation 
to getting and then keeping the job. While the 1940s and 1950s were in many ways different from 
today, some of the issues plaguing the ‘hung’ parliament elected in 2010 were evident then too. These 
include issues of trust, Cabinet leaks, rumblings from the back-bench, media speculation about 
leadership challenges and reliance on support from independents.1 An examination of the first federal 
hung parliament in Australian history provides an opportunity to examine issues such as the role and 
characteristics of leadership, the influence of independents, as well as the political choices and 
compromises that circumstances induce. This analysis shows that certain intangible characteristics, 
while hard to measure, but that include loyalty, trust and likeability, played a role in determining who 
led the government and under what circumstances. On the face of it, a perceived lack of these 
character traits played a part in Rudd’s removal from office in 2010.2   
This essay proceeds as follows.  First it provides an historical description of the circumstances that led 
to the first hung federal government in Australian history and the factors that combined to catapult 
Arthur Fadden into the Prime Ministership in 1941.  I draw upon literature and first person accounts 
to build a portrait of Fadden’s personal qualities which are then compared to later holders of the 
office.  Second, it gives a brief description of the circumstances that saw Fadden lose government 
after only 40 days – focussing specifically on how he lost crucial cross-bench support. Third, these 
events are considered alongside contemporary politics to ascertain what, if any conclusions can be 
drawn from history to shed light on Australia’s 43rd Parliament. I conclude that, regardless of the era, 
the prime ministership is both a gift and a burden, where control is, for the most part illusory.  
As much as possible, I utilise first-hand accounts and draw upon insights provided through interviews 
conducted with people who remembered Arthur Fadden and Robert Menzies through family or work 
connections. While Fadden penned no memoirs,3 insights into his character can be gleaned through 
the personal correspondence with political colleagues and friends, mainly after retirement, that have 
been deposited in the National Library’s extensive archives.4 Likewise, Menzies biographer Allan 
Martin’s files on his subject are accessible at the National Library of Australia.5  Observations on 
Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard are gleaned from secondary sources: books, newspapers and journal 
articles, but also include some observations on Rudd’s operational style from his time working for the 
Queensland government in the 1990s. Therefore the research method is historical, comparative and 
                                               
1 Hal Myers The Whispering Gallery 1999 and Gavin Souter’s Acts of Parliament 1988 give many examples of 
such events.  
2 Nicholas Stuart, Rudd’s Way November 2007-June 2010 (Victoria, 2010); David Marr ‘Power Trip: The 
Political Journal of Kevin Rudd, Quarterly Essay, Issue 38., 2009. 
3 I am not including his ghost written book ‘They called me Artie’ because it is largely a series of vignettes and 
witticisms that provide very little critical analysis about Fadden’s time in office. 
4 For details see Arklay, T ‘Arthur Fadden: a political silhouette’, (Melbourne, 2014 forthcoming).  
5 Papers of Allan Martin, 1954-2002, NLA 3297610, MS 9802.  
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interpretative and draws on the literature on political leadership and to a limited degree political 
psychology, in so far as the paper attempts a description of the drivers, emotions, interpersonal 
relationships and intergroup relations of the politicians under study.6 
The events of 1941 provide historical context to the dilemma which confronted the Gillard 
government after the 2010 election – how to hold onto power with minority support. This is a 
difficult, tight-rope act. The fact that the 43rd parliament functioned, in the legislative sense at least, is 
a testament to the tenacity of  Gillard as Prime Minister. Contemporary politics illustrate how difficult 
the business of politics is.  History shows that such difficulties, while exacerbated by a 24 hour news 
cycle, are not new.  Arthur Fadden’s government was defeated on the floor of the Parliament precisely 
because of his inability to maintain the support of key independents.  To comprehend this defeat, it is 
first necessary to understand the events that catapulted Arthur Fadden to the Prime Ministership in 
1941. The years following Fadden’s entry into the federal arena coincided with the gradual 
disintegration of the United Australia Party (UAP). Its decline was accelerated after the sudden death 
in office of Prime Minister Joe Lyons, and the succession of Robert Menzies to the leadership in 
1939.  
When a leadership impasse occurred in the Country Party not long after the election of 1940, Fadden 
was invited to assume the position of leader in an acting capacity. Once in the role he cemented his 
position, and he remained leader for a further seventeen years. Prime Minister Robert Menzies and his 
new deputy did not automatically see eye to eye. Apart from Menzies’ inherent distrust of the Country 
Party (CP), there were policy and ideological differences to iron out. The CP worried about how war 
restrictions would affect primary producers7 and later Fadden pressured Menzies in relation to the 
Communist Party.  As negotiations and war planning intensified, Menzies was absent from Australia 
for months at a time. Fadden assumed the role of acting Prime Minister and furthered the trust among 
not just his own colleagues, but those of the Opposition also. Curtin, not Menzies for example was 
effusive in his praise of Fadden after his stint as acting Prime Minister in 1941.  
During the absence of the Prime Minister abroad, the Treasurer (Mr. Fadden) who 
served as Acting Prime Minister, set a standard of service to Australia, and of 
association with parliament, which I greatly admire …8  
 
Tensions between Menzies and his party colleagues intensified upon his return and in August 1941 he 
was replaced as Prime Minister by Arthur Fadden who secured the votes of both the UAP and the CP 
– the first and only time a CP leader was made Prime Minister in his own right. 
Fadden’s ascension to the leadership was due to his ability to bring people together. He was 
gregarious, mixed easily and, because of this, built up trust among colleagues.  This trust saw him 
become the go-to leader for backbenchers, not just from the CP but also from the UAP.  It assisted 
Fadden in understanding what a particular faction was concerned about, and enabled him to act 
quickly to reassure, or at least explain the action or policy that troubled them. Menzies did not have 
                                               
6 For a succinct explanation on the history and influences in political psychology see James Walter, ‘Political 
Psychology’ in The Oxford Companion to Australian Politics, ed. Brian Galligan and Winsome Roberts, 
(Oxford, 2007). 
7 National Archives Australia (NAA): A2697, vol.5, cabinet submission 512, 11 December 1940. 
8 CPD 1941, vol.167, p.25. 
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this easy approachability and was, in his own words, prone to “intolerance and hasty judgements”.9 
As Fadden once self-deprecatingly remarked, “Ming doesn’t tolerant fools easily, and we are none too 
keen on him either”.10   To his credit, Menzies learnt the painful lessons and softened his personal 
style in his second term (1949-1966).11 He remains Australia’s longest serving Prime Minister.  
Prime Ministers have only limited opportunities to choose the circumstances surrounding their terms 
in office. Fadden and Menzies had the Second World War thrust upon them; Rudd in 2008 had the 
Global Financial Crisis, while Gillard had to forge a distinct identity for her government, based 
nominally around the Labor tradition but one that paradoxically emphasises economic management as 
a core goal, with no slack in terms of parliamentary numbers, a hostile Opposition, and with the 
Greens and independents to mollify. Minority governments highlight how the prime ministership may 
be the most powerful office in the land, but also how it is a co-dependent office, reliant on the support 
of political colleagues, the public service, party factions, the media, the electorate and other vested 
interests. It is a role that is heavily reliant on the vagaries caused by the “complex and contingent 
nature of power”.12  
Theories of leadership 
There are multiple ways of defining leadership.13  Rarely does a leader fit one theoretical model. For 
instance while JW Burns’ typology of a transactional leader14 can be helpful in understanding aspects 
of Fadden’s leadership (Fadden was a strong advocate for the interests of the Country Party’s 
constituents, achieved many concessions for them during his parliamentary career and in return 
received their support and consolidated his position as leader), he also fits into the category of 
supportive leader. As a supportive leader he frequently displayed behaviour that ensured the 
“satisfaction of subordinates’ needs and preferences” by giving individuals opportunities to shine and 
by creating a friendly, supportive working environment.15 In that way he displayed elements of what 
Greenleaf described as ‘servant leadership’, in that he had a strong desire to serve others and for the 
most part was prepared to help, listen and was thus effective.16 On the other hand Kevin Rudd 
displayed transformational leadership qualities. This is best illustrated by his 2008 apology to 
                                               
9 Robert Menzies, Afternoon light: some memories of men and events, (Melbourne, 1967 p 44-5).   
10 Sir James Killen, (former Queensland Liberal MP and friend of Fadden), interview by author 6 June 2001. 
11 Brian Costar, ‘The politics of coalition’ in Scott Prasser, John Nethercote & John Warhurst, The Menzies era: 
a reappraisal of government, politics and policy, (Melbourne, 1995). 
12 R.A.W. Rhodes ‘From Prime Ministerial Leadership to Court Politics’ in Paul Strangio, Paul ‘t Hart and 
James Walter (eds.), Understanding Prime Ministerial Performance, Comparative Perspectives. (Oxford 
University Press, 2013).  
13 See for example, Max Weber, On charisma and institution building (Chicago,1968); James Burns, Leadership 
(New York 1978);  Peter Northouse, Leadership: theory and practice (California, 2004); Paul ‘t Hart and John 
Uhr, Public Leadership: perspectives and practices, (Canberra 2008). 
14 J.M. Burns, Leadership  (New York, 1978). 
15 Austin Selleck (private secretary to Arthur Fadden) interviewed by author, February 13, 2003.  
16 The concept of ‘servant-leadership’ was introduced by Robert Greenleaf in his book Servant Leadership (New 
York, 1977). R. Cunningham’s “Servant Leadership – an introduction”, Global Virtue Ethics Review, (2004):v 
5(3):2-6, provides a succinct run-down of how the model is applied in reality.  
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Australia’s indigenous people, as well as his early work on climate change. Leadership is more 
nuanced than any one definition can provide.  
 
Learning on the job 
The cliché “nice guys finish last” seems custom-made for politics, with epitaphs such as ‘head-
kicker’, ‘great hater’, ‘kingmaker’, or even Paul Keating’s reflection that “leadership is not about 
being popular”,17 regarded as more closely reflecting reality. Yet twenty-two interviews conducted 
over several years with people who worked with or remembered Arthur Fadden, suggest that in his 
case at least, he was generally regarded as a nice man.18 Avuncular, friendly, a great socialiser, and “a 
hail-fellow-well-met associate of everyone”19 were some of the terms used to describe Fadden.  
Conversely Menzies, at least in his first iteration as Prime Minister, was perceived as arrogant, 
pompous, aloof and judgmental.  Percy Spender once said Menzies was a person who “regarded 
himself as a superior being. His great fault was that he could not conceal this regard for himself from 
others”.20  
Kevin Rudd tried another tack. He presented himself as a humble Queenslander, a boy from the 
country, who had a tough start to life. His early-career decision to work for Wayne Goss, initially as 
his chief of staff and later as director-general of the Queensland Cabinet Office in the early 1990s, 
proved he was “demanding”, and exacting on staff.21  More recently in October 2012 Julia Gillard 
sent ripples throughout the Western world when she took a stand on sexism and misogyny in the 
parliament. Her “superior negotiation skills” won over the independents in 2010, while her capacity to 
weather a barrage of criticism, some of a personal nature, won her new respect.22 
Amiable and gregarious, Fadden first won the position of (acting) leader, selected as the compromise 
candidate in desperation by a party stalled after three separate ballots failed to end the deadlock. He 
was confirmed in the role, six months later – an appointment made largely on the basis of Fadden’s 
                                               
17 Don Watson, ‘A Portrait of Paul Keating PM’ Recollections of a bleeding heart (Sydney 2011, p. 21) records 
the full quote as being “Leadership is not about being popular. It’s about being right and about being strong… 
It’s about doing what you think the nation requires, making profound judgments about profound issues”.  
18 Twenty-two interviews were conducted in the course of researching the career of Arthur Fadden. Fadden died 
in 1973 and so many of those still alive who remembered him were themselves quite old at the time of 
interview. Acknowledging that interviews contain retrospective judgements and bias, the author triangulated 
them with other sources or assessments of Fadden to help develop an overall portrait (for more on the method, 
see Barry Gustafson ‘History, biography and leadership: grasping public lives’ in Paul ‘tHart and John Uhr (eds) 
Public leadership: perspectives and practices, ANU E Press, (Canberra, 2008, p.103). 
19 Percy Spender Politics and a man (Sydney 1972, p.74) 
20 He was cited by Judith Brett, Robert Menzies Forgotten People (Sydney 1992, p.292 f.n.6 and by Cameron 
Hazlehurst, Menzies Observed (Sydney 1979 p.186) 
21 Patrick Weller is cited in Paul Kelly’s ‘Smart, casual Kevin’ The Weekend Australian Magazine’s, October 
27-28, 2007, portrait of Opposition Leader Kevin Rudd. Weller goes on to say, ‘He pushes people and pushes 
them hard. He won’t be satisfied with second-rate advice or performance’.  
22 Tanya Plibersek speaking with Emma Alberici on ABC Lateline 9 October 2012. 




“gift of friendship”.23 Labor Senator John Armstrong recalled Fadden won the nomination because 
“he was a man of great qualities and great ability”.24  Serendipity played a part in his rise to the 
leadership of the CP, but he held the job through a combination of adept political skills, not taking his 
support base for granted, and by doggedly pursuing a course of action or policy. Fadden maintained 
his grip on the Treasury portfolio (a position he held twice 1940-41; 1949-58) until his retirement.  
His reputation as a team player was cemented by his experiences as treasurer in the early 1950s, when 
the economy, still recovering from war, also faced a rapid rise in inflation.  Throughout this period, 
but particularly in 1951, Fadden held his nerve and introduced a number of difficult measures that 
collectively became known as the “horror budget”. This budget is mentioned here because it speaks to 
Fadden’s character. He suffered a great deal of personal and political fallout because of the budgetary 
measures he introduced, yet he held firm and became recognised as a tough performer who was not 
easily deterred. The way he managed set-backs and criticism in both the early 1940s and again later 
gave Fadden a stock of moral capital that provided him with enough goodwill to weather 
controversies on which less well-liked contemporaries might have foundered.25   
What were the particular skills that enabled Fadden’s long career in politics? And importantly, what, 
if any, lessons do they provide for contemporary leaders? Archived letters and interviews from people 
closely associated with Fadden during his years as Treasurer, indicate that his departmental staff 
viewed him as someone who would ably represent its views in Cabinet. For the most part Fadden 
accepted the advice proffered by his department head, Roland Wilson. Hugh Morgan26 claimed that 
Fadden had “earned the unqualified respect of Roland Wilson”,27 no mean feat when considered 
alongside Wilson’s intellectual reputation as Australia’s longest serving Treasury head.28  Some 
interviewed had the impression that senior journalists, including Alan Reid, had protected Fadden 
throughout his career. When questioned on why this might have occurred, the word “likability” was 
repeatedly invoked.29 Sir John Carrick spoke of a more nuanced Fadden, suggesting he possessed a 
“deeper intellect and sensitivity than he was willing to disclose to the public”.30 
Loyalty alongside likability and a determination to no longer work with someone was on show when 
Julia Gillard was urged by a majority in the Caucus to replace Kevin Rudd as Prime Minister in 
Februray 2010, and again in 2012 when, following a challenge by Rudd, she was confirmed in the 
                                               
23 Edgar Holt, Politics is people: the men of the Menzies era, (Sydney 1969); but also James Killen, interviewed 
by author 6 June 2001; Wallace Brown, (author and former press gallery journalist, Canberra) interviewed by 
author 18 February 2003. 
24 NLA:TRC 121/68, Interview with John Armstrong, diplomat; interviewed by Mel Pratt, 1975. 
25 Arklay, Arthur Fadden.  
26 Hugh Morgan in a speech delivered at St John’s College, University of Sydney on 28 November 1991 entitled 
‘Australia and the world: immigration and its consequences’ 
(http://www.page.org.au/assets/files/orations/lecture_1991_morgan.pdf).   
27 This view was supported by Wilson’s wife who indicated that her husband trusted Fadden (Joyce Wilson 
(second wife of Sir Roland Wilson, Canberra) interviewed by author, 18 August 2005. 
28 Selwyn Cornish ‘Sir Roland Wilson a biographical essay’ (Canberra, n/d). 
29 Wallace Brown, interviewed by author 18 February 2003.  
30 J Carrick, pers.comm., 1 October 2002.  
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role.  According to many press interviews given by Cabinet and Caucus colleagues of Rudd and 
Gillard, her negotiating skills and a clear and consistent work style were in stark contrast to her 
predecessor and ensured her (71 to 31) caucus ballot victory.31  Ultimately loyalty and likeability did 
not protect her:  in June 2013 Rudd succeeded in ousting her as Labor leader.  But the support she did 
secure seems to confirm that, 70 years on, politics remain intrinsically about relationships. Many of 
the circumstances surrounding Gillard’s promotion in 2010 were strikingly similar to the political 
events that unseated Robert Menzies in 1941.32   
 
Governing without the numbers – then and now 
The vicissitudes of minority status plague governments. In Fadden’s case, it ensured his term as Prime 
Minister was short, a mere 40 days. While John Curtin assumed office, also as the leader of a minority 
government in 1941, the support of the Fadden-led Opposition provided the surety it needed to govern 
with confidence in its initial phase. This provided an opportunity for the government to establish its 
credentials and be returned at the 1943 election. There are significant differences between 1941 and 
2012. The Gillard government had identifiable policy objectives despite a lacklustre way of 
promoting them, while the Opposition it faced was more adversarial in refusing to accept the 
government’s legitimacy than the coalition was after its defeat in 1941.  
The federal election of 1937 had resulted in the UAP and ALP both holding 29 seats. The CP’s 16 
seats were crucial in shoring up support. Then Prime Minister Joseph Lyons worked with his coalition 
partner in a parliament divided by policy issues as diverse as national insurance, conscription and 
defence spending.33 But it was the fall-out from the Country Party’s boycott of National Insurance 
that placed a real strain on the viability of the government. Attorney General, Robert Menzies 
resigned from the ministry in exasperation, not long before Lyons died suddenly in Sydney.34 The 
government, described as a “nest of impatient egos”, was further hindered by the intransigence of the 
CP’s leader, Earle Page, acting as Prime Minister after Lyon’s death while the UAP chose another 
from among their ranks.35 To understand Page’s intransigence it is necessary to recall that in the 1922 
parliament he had refused to work with Billy Hughes as PM, thus causing Hughes to resign in favour 
of Lyons.  
                                               
31 See for example: Rob Mitchell, Interview. ABC AM, 27 February 2012 ‘Backbenchers split between Gillard 
and Rudd’ (http://www.abc.net.au/am/content/2012/s3439909.htm). 
32 Although Rudd had led the Labor Party to government gaining a swing of 5.7%, and thus a comfortable 
majority in 2007 of 83 – 150 seats in the House of Reps, by 2010 much of this support had dissipated. Opinion 
polls were showing declining support for the Rudd-led government. The 2010 federal election fought under 
Gillard saw Labor and the coalition each holding 72 seats.  Gillard won government after gaining the support of 
the Greens’ Adam Bandt and three Independent Members of the House of Representatives, Andrew Wilkie, Rob 
Oakeshott and Tony Windsor.  
33 Allan Martin Robert Menzies: a life, (Melbourne,1993); David Day, The Politics of War, (Sydney, 2003) 
Arthur Fadden Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), House of Representatives, 1938, Vol 156, p. 
1694.  
34 Costar ‘The politics of coalition’ p. 94; Martin, Robert Menzies: a life, pp. 264-5). 




In the 1938 parliament, Page faced a different protagonist in Robert Menzies. In an ill-judged, final 
attempt to prevent Menzies from becoming PM, Page launched a vicious attack on him in the 
Parliament. Fadden, a relative new-comer to federal politics, could not support this attack and in 
protest stood aside from the Country Party. His influence was telling when three other backbenchers 
joined him on the cross-benches.36 Page’s attack further hardened Menzies’ resentment of the CP 
which he increasingly viewed as a “selfish sectional interest”.37   As the United Kingdom became 
increasingly preoccupied with events in Europe, Menzies’ minority government was further isolated. 
Earle Page remained the Country Party’s leader, with the parliament chugging along until war was 
declared in September 1939.  Unlike today’s hung Parliament, the House met infrequently during this 
period, especially after the initial push to pass wartime legislation such as the National Security Act 
and the Trading with the Enemy Acts.38  
Minority government troubled Menzies who desired a degree of support for his wartime measures. He 
attempted to negotiate with the ALP to see if it would be willing to participate in a national governing 
arrangement under his lead. The fact that he preferred to negotiate with the Labor Opposition 
indicates the extent of Menzies’ distrust of the Country Party. Undeterred, Page continued to lobby for 
a “composite government” arrangement, but Menzies would not consider any offer of a reformed 
coalition, as long as Page remained leader. As the war intensified and Australia’s position looked 
increasingly vulnerable, Menzies sent Minister Richard Casey as his envoy to England.  
While he was away, Casey was offered and accepted the position of Australia’s first Ambassador to 
Washington.  The subsequent March 1940 by-election in Casey’s seat of Corio proved disastrous for 
the government. Now in an even more tenuous position, Menzies had a new imperative to readmit the 
CP into Cabinet.39 But first Page had to stand down as leader. After some period of negotiation, 
Archie Cameron replaced Page. The dissident members of the CP returned to the ranks and on 14 
March 1940 a new Cabinet was announced that included Fadden as junior minister without portfolio 
assisting the minister for supply and development, and also as minister without portfolio assisting the 
treasurer, Percy Spender.  Tensions in government continued, not helped by the diverse viewpoints 
within the coalition. As just one example, war-time rationing dismayed some CP members,40 while 
the decision to ban the Communist Party in June 1940 was contentious among more Liberal members 
of the UAP. Menzies’ position was further weakened when three key ministerial allies were killed in a 
plane crash near Canberra. Two days after this accident, Fadden’s trial period as junior minister ended 
and he was appointed minister for air and civil defence. Leading a government wracked with 
divisions, it was with some apprehension that Menzies announced the 1940 election. The result was 
not completely unexpected.  
                                               
36 Along with Fadden (Darling Downs), EB Corser from Wide Bay (QLD), TJ Collins, from Hume (QLD) and 
A Badman from Grey (SA) all stood aside from the Country Party following Page’s attack. See Arthur Fadden 
They called me Artie Brisbane 1969.  
37 Martin, Robert Menzies: a life, p. 195.  
38 The House of Reps met on only 57 days in 1939 and 41 days in 1940, for details see K. Bailey, ‘The war 
emergency legislation of the Commonwealth’ Australian Journal of Public Administration, Vol 4, 1 (March 
1942), pp11-27.  
39 Fadden The called me Artie p. 42.   
40 National Archives Australia (NAA), ‘Cabinet submission 512’, A2697, vol. 5. 11 December 1940. 
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After the 1940 poll the parliament consisted of 23 UAP, fourteen CP, 32 ALP and six independents. 
Four of the independents were members of Jack Lang’s Non-Communist Labor Party, who sided with 
Labor on most issues. Thus it was the remaining two independents from Victoria, Arthur William 
Coles (Henty) and Alexander Wilson (Wimmera) who effectively held the balance of power. It was a 
tenuous position for the government.  The CP had lost two seats. At its first party room meeting after 
the poll the leadership was put to the vote. Cameron received no support.41 Earle Page and John 
McEwen nominated for the leadership but after three failed attempts Fadden was asked to end the 
impasse by agreeing to become the ‘acting’ leader. Showing considerable political nous, Fadden 
accepted on the proviso that both McEwen and Page supported his nomination. Percy Spender, the 
man Fadden replaced as Treasurer, noted that Fadden’s appointment meant that “one of the most 
popular of men in the parliament – a hail-fellow-well-met associate of everyone” was now treasurer 
and deputy prime minister.42 In coming to the leadership, Fadden replaced older styles of 
idiosyncratic, at times bombastic, leadership with a more consensual approach. Likeability may not 
normally be the quality that first comes to mind when explaining the success of political leaders. 
However, it was Fadden’s ability to get on with people, and the trust and rapport that he was able to 
engender, that set him apart from his contemporaries.43  
 
Arthur Fadden for Prime Minister 
Fadden’s first war-time budget was not an easy sell and restrictions imposed won him few friends. In 
the House it was criticised by one of the independents supporting the government, Arthur Coles, who 
argued ‘there was a big field at the top of the income class that has not been properly ploughed’.44 But 
importantly the budget also served as an indicator of how Fadden bore criticism and defended his 
departmental staff. His reaction was remembered years later by treasury officials.45  The government 
was close to being defeated on its budget. In a last ditch effort, Menzies threatened to dissolve both 
houses of parliament and call an early election. This had the desired effect and the immediate crisis 
was averted.  
Fadden served as acting prime minister for five months in 1941 while Menzies travelled to the United 
Kingdom and Egypt.46 Thus Fadden, as chair of the war cabinet and the all-party advisory war 
council, was privy to information regarding troop deployments and home defence.47 For national 
security reasons, statements on war cabinet and advisory war council considerations were subjected to 
                                               
41 West Australian MP Henry Gregory did eventually nominate him – adding though that this should not be 
taken to mean he supported Cameron, but rather that he thought it unfair that the current leader received no 
nominations (see Paul Davey, The Nationals: the Progressive, Country and National Party in New South Wales, 
1919 to 2005, (Sydney 2006).  
42 Spender Politics and the man p.74. 
43 Heather Henderson, (daughter of Sir Robert Menzies) interviewed by author 20 February 2003.  
44 Coles was quoted in the newspaper Worker, 6 December 1940. 
45 Joyce Wilson, interviewed by author, 18 August 2005. 
46 NAA:A463, ‘Correspondence files, various government agencies’ 1958/131. 
47 NLA:MS 1538,45.2, 14 February 1941: ‘Summary of the decisions of the war cabinet’,  Papers of William 
Morris Hughes, 1864-1958. 
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censorship laws. As acting PM, Fadden had exclusive authority to issue press statements on behalf of 
the government. Sometimes Menzies felt that Fadden took these laws too lightly, on one occasion 
indicating via cablegram that he was 
Much disturbed and embarrassed by reported statements from Australia… You will fully 
appreciate how important it is that I should be able to face …my work .. in Great Britain 
without occupying a lot of time breaking down prejudices created by indiscreet statements in 
Australia.48  
But closer to events near Australia, Fadden was aware the Labor opposition had growing 
apprehension about Australia’s war preparedness. Despite Menzies’ unambiguous message, 
Fadden continued to issue statements, warning that Australia’s “very existence” was at stake.49 
This was backed up on 13 February when Fadden, Curtin and Beasley issued a joint statement 
declaring that the war had entered a new and dangerous stage.50 Years later Fadden recalled the 
statement in his book:  
We think we should tell the people of Australia that it is the considered opinion of the 
War Council that the war has moved on to a new stage involving the utmost gravity … 
What the future has in store is at present not precisely clear. What is clear is that 
Australian safety makes it essential that there should be neither delay nor doubt about the 
clamant need for the greatest effort of preparedness this country has ever made.51  
With Menzies away, the advisory war council was “developed …into an instrument of all-party 
cooperation”.52 Fadden held a secret session of Parliament to discuss the British plan that war in the 
Pacific should be regarded as a “holding” war and most MPs seemed glad to have the opportunity to 
confidentially discuss the war.53 
While in Australia, Fadden and Curtin were stressing the need for vigilance, Menzies issued a 
statement from London hoping that peace with Japan could be realised. Due to time delays Menzies 
had not seen the most recent communiqués, which among other things noted that the United States 
would not commit to entering the war should a British dominion be attacked. The distance and 
difficulty in communication meant Menzies was frequently ill-informed about what was happening 
near Australia. Fadden informed him via cable of the German assault in North Africa for example; 
and only after receiving a flurry of cables from home did Menzies express reservations about the 
position of Australian troops in Tobruk.54 In its wartime planning the Australian cabinet was guided 
by British advice and information. With the advantage of hindsight, it is obvious that this advice was 
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often partial, and on occasions, completely biased or wrong. The ill-fated Greek campaign was an 
example of this, prompting Menzies to record in his diary the question: “[w]hy does a peaceable man 
become a Prime Minister?” 55  
Menzies returned to Australia on 24 May 1941. Immediately it was apparent that tension existed 
between him and his deputy. After the official greeting, Menzies left in the car that had delivered 
Fadden to greet him. While there are some conflicting assessments of reasons behind the tension, the 
majority consensus was that Fadden was treated badly by Menzies on his return.56 Gavin Souter for 
example reported that the PM greeted Fadden with “a coolness verging on rudeness”,57 while Judith 
Brett noted that “Artie Fadden, who had held the fort during his extended stay in London and had 
come to welcome him home, was left standing at the airport without a word of thanks after Menzies 
commandeered his car.”58  A former private secretary of Menzies recalled the events years later, in a 
personal letter to Fadden, and agreed that Menzies “ignored” him.59   One explanation of the tension 
was that Menzies was aware of the mounting disquiet over his leadership. It is difficult to ascertain 
whether or not Fadden played a role in undermining him, but shortly after his return Menzies spoke in 
the parliament of the “diabolical game of politics” (in comparison to Britain) being played out in 
Australia. He made no mention of Fadden’s work as acting PM, leaving it to John Curtin to pay credit 
to Fadden’s contribution in the Parliament.60   
For his part, Fadden always denied having a role in Menzies’ downfall. Indeed, when the 
dissatisfaction with Menzies came to a head, Fadden was the only CP minister to support him.61 
Certainly when asked by the press if he had prime ministerial aspirations, Fadden replied that it would 
“depend upon the circumstances under which Mr. Menzies relinquished the leadership of the UAP, 
the nature of the request made and my assessment of the extent of the support offered”.62  Menzies 
leadership hung in the balance. Press reports indicate that there was general agreement that the 
government had failed in its war effort, but this was coupled with a sense of dismay about the lack of 
an alternative government. Pressure was growing on John Curtin to mount a challenge. As the Daily 
Telegraph, 9 August 1941 noted:  
The truth – and Mr. Curtin knows it – is that his party is no more capable than any other leader of 
the UAP-UCP coalition of commanding the majority needed to establish stable government…the 
only advice that Mr. Curtin should presume to offer the Government now is a request of an 
immediate election’.  
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John Curtin faltered, and no election date was set. Instead after failing in his bid to get the ALP to 
agree to an “all-party government”, Menzies resigned from the leadership of the UAP and the prime 
ministership. At the joint meeting of the two conservative parties that followed, Fadden was elected 
unopposed. It was a poisoned chalice; there was little option but to accept. Menzies publicly declared 
his support for Fadden, and was appointed minister for defence coordination. Journalist Clem Lack 
attributed Fadden’s meteoric rise to “his outstanding ability as a financial debater, plus the gift of 
being the best ‘good mixer’ the political game can show”.63 Press clippings of the day seem to 
confirm that Fadden’s success was determined by the rapport and trust he engendered in those around 
him, on his approachability and likeability. His success was firmly centred on the relationships he 
built up around himself. Fadden led from the centre – and allowed others to shine.64   
 
Minority governments, then and now  
Circumstances have changed.   At the head of a minority government from 2010 onward Julia Gillard  
survived as Prime Minister against the odds, defying poor opinion polls, a fractious parliament, 
intransigent opposition and with an uninspired communication strategy.  Despite this, the federal 
parliament continued to function. Thus 190 pieces of legislation were enacted in 2011 – considerably 
up on the average of 106 Acts per year since 1901, securing an overall ‘top-ten’ position.65  It scored 
some significant legislative victories, as in May 2013 when it negotiated passage of legislation 
through both Houses for a landmark National Disability Insurance Scheme. The Gillard government 
also won a High Court challenge by ‘big tobacco’ against its plain packaging legislation, a victory that 
was observed and lauded around the world.  As Prime Minister Gillard faced some similar problems 
to those tackled by Fadden. She was elevated to the Prime Ministership in 2010 after most in the 
caucus were unable or unwilling to any longer work with Kevin Rudd . Menzies and Rudd too shared 
similar characteristics. Both were intelligent and well educated. Both were somewhat stilted media 
performers, although Menzies would later excel at reaching out to the “forgotten Australians” while 
Rudd garnered media attention through the use of, at times, nerdy Australianisms.66  
Each of the prime ministers studied here faced a difficult policy environment (war, economic 
downturn – Menzies, Fadden; GFC, war – Rudd, Gillard). Three (including Gillard in 2013) were 
removed from office because they failed to hold majority support from colleagues in their own 
parties. As Spender recalled, there had been ongoing “whisperers in the corridors, and to the Press, 
against Menzies, demanding… that he should resign, and make way for Fadden”.67 Stuart likewise 
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argued that Rudd “ignored his political colleagues and prevented them from contributing” and that 
while he “blamed factions and opinion polls for his demise, … this was only half right”.68 Day cited 
Fadden’s ‘affability [which allowed] a spirit of cooperation with his Labor opponents that the more 
arrogant Menzies had been unable to produce’.69 As the career lows of both Menzies and Rudd 
highlight, their mismanagement of people contributed to their difficulties in office.   
While there are differences to the way Fadden and Gillard came to power – notably that Fadden was a 
reluctant recruit to the office of PM, whereas Gillard was an eager contender –  there are also some 
similarities. Colleagues selected Julia Gillard because a majority trusted her. Stuart asserts she 
“commanded the votes and, more importantly, the friendship of many in the caucus, because they 
could warm to her as a person”.70 In the political mayhem following the 2010 poll and return of a 
hung parliament, despite being offered “everything” by Opposition Leader Tony Abbot, two key 
independents finally supported Gillard’s minority-led government as the one “most likely to provide 
stability”.71   
The two independents in the 1941 parliament had supported the Menzies-led government. Arthur 
Coles (a director of the Coles retail store) had returned from a self-funded unofficial mission to the 
United States and London to see the war effort first-hand. In April 1941 he brought to Fadden (then 
acting PM) his twenty-two-point plan72 that examined a range of issues including the expansion of 
central government, taxation, trade and employment.73 For once Fadden’s interpersonal skills let him 
down. He left Coles waiting outside the prime minister’s office for a long time, and then effectively 
ignored his memorandum. This slight was probably remembered by Coles months later when he 
foreclosed on Fadden’s government. Fadden and Coles had different versions of their relationship. 
Fadden suggested that Coles was lobbying for a Cabinet place, while Coles denied this motivation. 
Curtin’s biographer Lloyd Ross perhaps gives the most unbiased account for why Fadden might have 
had problems trusting Coles, noting he was “unstable politically, subjective to the extreme, a 
conceited supporter of Menzies, patriotic in excelsis, and impulsive in reversing his political 
loyalties”.74  
Fadden’s government was plagued from the start. Eddie Ward delighted in leaking a document that 
the PM had known of a payment made by the attorney-general, Billy Hughes, to unionists in an 
attempt to quell industrial unrest. The source of the leak was journalist Joseph Winkler, who had been 
briefly employed by Prime Minister Menzies. While Menzies was quick to disassociate himself from 
the leak, the damage to the government was inestimable.75   In another secret session of both Houses 
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of Parliament, Fadden disclosed that a secret fund had existed since 1916 and that money had been 
used by successive governments to ensure Australian security.  In this particular case, £4800 had been 
given to the Australian Democratic Front to fund “meetings, salaries, travelling expenses, and 
printing”.76 He appointed a royal commission to investigate, and the report that was handed down 
after Fadden lost government found that there was no substance to any of the allegations. This affair, 
described in Parliament as “a great noise…over such a little matter”77 served to undermine Fadden’s 
standing as PM. Governments will always have to deal with issues brought on by careless, or 
attention-seeking comments; however these incidents take on much more significance when there is a 
minority government. 
On 25 September 1941 Fadden presented his second budget (his first as prime minister). The budget 
proposed an increase in war expenditure, provided increased pay and allowances to members of the 
armed services along with the expansion of housing facilities for munitions workers. In a nod to his 
North Queensland roots, there was also a provision of funds to develop alternative fuels – including 
power alcohol. While the child endowment scheme remained, the government used the budget to 
announce it would seek to borrow loans totalling £122 million, to be repaid after the war. Fadden 
announced a “national contribution”, which was to be collected on every income over £100.78  One 
week later Labor moved an amendment to the budget to allow it to “be recast to ensure a more 
equitable distribution of the national burden”.79 Fadden would later refer to this as a day of betrayal 
and raw ambition. Coles and Wilson both voted with the opposition on the amendment, and Fadden’s 
government fell.  
Not even the defeat of the government could restore the coalition’s faith in Menzies, who along with 
Percy Spender were named by the media as the two most likely to contend the ballot.80 The UAP as 
the largest party was expected to nominate the leader from among their ranks, but the party room 
meeting voted 19 to 12 against Menzies’ motion that they should select the Opposition Leader. A 
disappointed Menzies refused to renominate and Billy Hughes was chosen to lead the UAP. At the 
joint party meeting that followed, Arthur Fadden was selected to lead the joint party opposition.  
While an honour and a first for the Country Party, leading such a disunited rabble was not easy. 
Fadden acquired the role with a reservoir of goodwill, not just from his party colleagues but also from 
among the journalists in Canberra. There had already been discussions that Fadden would be the 
person most likely to work cooperatively with the new PM and allow the “war machinery to 
function”.81 In fact, Fadden did not always make Curtin’s work easier – arguing strongly for 
conscription for example. But despite the adversarial approach to some aspects of policy, in 
November 1941, Curtin rose before the parliamentary recess to thank Fadden for his “complete 
generosity” which had been extended to himself as a “novice”.82  Menzies continued to bide his time. 
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Acutely aware of the power of the press, he began to provide commentary on international affairs 
through a regular Friday night radio broadcast.83 He would continue to deliver these broadcasts until 
April 1944. They provided him with an opportunity to reconnect to the Australian public. Meanwhile, 
Fadden had an increasingly difficult job managing the “cacophony of differing views in the 
opposition”. Pleas for unity were largely ignored.84  Relations with the government nose-dived when 
Eddie Ward claimed that both Menzies and Fadden had devised a “Brisbane Line”, which left large 
parts of Northern Australia undefended.85 After weeks of heated discussion, Fadden moved a “motion 
of want of confidence” in the government and demanded Curtin issue an unequivocal denial of 
Ward’s allegations. Curtin responded by suspending Ward from his ministerial duties. A Royal 
Commission was ordered that cleared Fadden of proposing a Brisbane line.86 But the damage had 
been done.  
The election of 1943 was remembered by Fadden because of Menzies’ repudiation of post-war 
credits, a central plank in his campaign. Fadden reacted to Menzies’ criticism unwisely, referring to 
the “stab in the back” which he called one more “betrayal in the series for which Mr Menzies has 
become notorious… The statement came as no surprise to me … because the personal ambition of one 
man thought it preferable that we should lose this election.”87   A victory that had seemed unlikely 
before was impossible now. Labor was returned with an overwhelming majority of 49 seats to the 
coalition’s 22. Following such a dismal result, Fadden gladly handed the leadership of the coalition to 
Menzies, while he “retired to the corner to lead my own party in a happier atmosphere of mateship 
and unity”.88  
Are there lessons to be learnt from Fadden’s experience of minority leadership?  Certainly, how a 
prime minister manages the egos and countervailing demands of those supporters who are 
unrestrained by party allegiance depends in part on their personality. Menzies never had to wrestle 
with a minority government after his initial period in office, but he did have to manage coalition 
relations. This was decidedly easier while Fadden was leader than after John McEwen took over in the 
late 1950s.89 Menzies’ leadership style should be viewed in two distinct stages. The first (1933-1941) 
saw him as a young, arrogant man incapable of listening to the views of average Australians or his 
backbench. The second, beginning in 1943 and continuing until Menzies retired in 1966, was 
markedly different. “His first taste of political defeat acted like a tonic, for it was a novel and 
instructive experience which made him a better leader afterwards” noted Fadden, while Costar 
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suggests that Menzies’ relationship with the CP can also be divided into two periods, pre and post 
1944.90  
So what if any, are the lessons from history? While Arthur Fadden was most definitely a man of his 
time, his ability to win over people, gain and then keep their respect was crucial to his remaining in 
political jobs of his choice (deputy prime minister, treasurer) for eleven years. While the Oppositions 
of the day were at times adversarial, and managing some renegade members in both the government 
and opposition was at times hard, the leadership of the Opposition was, for the most part, accepting of 
the government’s legitimacy. A degree of cooperation, perhaps due to the war, was evident that was 
completely absent from the 43rd Parliament.   Modern day leaders inhabit a much more complicated 
world. Menzies precarious position was certainly exacerbated by a hostile media, but he did not have 
to contend with the constant barrage of adverse polling that so endangered both Rudd in 2010 and 
Gillard thereafter. Individual circumstances faced by the different leaders are also important factors 
and need to be considered. Menzies resigned after consulting his Cabinet, Fadden filled a void left 
vacant due to a dysfunctional UAP. Thus inter- and intra-party strife led to Fadden’s elevation to the 
office of PM in 1941.  When Gillard initially took over leadership of her party in 2010 it then had a 
clear parliamentary majority.  Fadden became the leader of a minority government, relying on support 
from two ‘rotten reeds’, who had a clear agenda and supported the deposed leader. Intra-party strife 
cost the ALP its majority during the 2010 election.  But thereafter Gillard was able to negotiate the 
terms of her minority government and the nature of the support of key independents in the House of 
Representatives. This is a significant difference and should not be overlooked.  
Yet, as this analysis indicates, the prime ministership remains a gift and a burden. Control is hard won 
and, at times, illusory. History confirms that a leader who fails to command the ongoing support of his 
party could never ultimately command control of the Parliament and succeed as prime minister. Yet 
every prime minister has only limited opportunity to choose the circumstances surrounding their terms 
in office. At all times they are reliant on the support of political colleagues, the public service, party 
factions, the media, the electorate and other vested interests. It is a role neatly summed up in Rhodes’ 
words, ‘the complex and contingent nature of power”,91 to lose support of any and as prime minister 
you are on shaky ground. 
Post script 
Rudd lost his second tilt at the Prime Ministership when Labor was convincingly voted out of office 
on September 7 2013 (HoR: Coalition 90 seats, ALP 55, Others 5). Julia Gillard did not contest the 
election nor did she make any comment throughout the campaign. Still, from remarks made 
subsequently (see Roxon, 17 October 2013)92, it is clear a considerable degree of animosity still exists 
within Labor’s ranks. Can the new leadership team, Bill Shorten and Tanya Plibersek restore party 
equilibrium? It will be no easy task, as Menzies and Fadden found during the opposition years of 
1941-49, but restoring internal harmony and trust will be necessary if Labor is to become a viable 
alternative for government in the future.  
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